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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Since this is a property tax and ownership is the subject
of the tax it can readily be understood why the lessee should bear
the burden here. The criterion is not to whom the benefit accrues
but in whom the property is vested. Emphasizing the benefit ele-
ment is rather confusing, especially so since the conclusion is un-
doubtedly correct and inasmuch as the court alludes indirect-
ly to the element of ownership.
-WLM CALLAHAN.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - ImPLIED PowER TO TAX FOR AD-
VETISING PURPOSES. - May a municipality levy a tax for munici-
pal advertising purposes, in the absence of any express statutory
authority or provision in the charter ? The question arose, ap-
parently for the first time,' and was decided in the negative in the
recent case of Leob v. City of Jacksonville.'
To uphold the power to levy this tax the power must be
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted such corporation, in accordance with the widely quoted
general rule,' for there is no express power, and it seems obvious
such power is not essential to the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation.
It is true the interests of the inhabitants may require the
acquisition and operation by the city of certain businesses and
properties such as water, lighting, and street railways. Cities are
so empowered by legislatures, but is an incidental power thereto
the advertising of such proprietary rights to the end that such
activities may be increased, and thus better civic institutions se-
cured by reason of increased population? The court in the princi-
pal case held that no such incidental power exists, and it is sub-
mitted that the decision of the court is correct, and desirable as
well.
Expenses incurred by public officials or employees in at-
'But ef. Mitchell v. St. Paul, 114 Minn. 141, 130 N. W. 66 (1911) where
the 1905 charter of the city of St. Paul authorized the establishment of "a
contingent fund not to exceed $10,000 to be used by the common council for
such purposes as it may deem calculated to promote the general welfare of
the city."1 It was held that advertising the city, through a publicity bureau,
was a purpose provided for by the contingent fund.
2134 So. 205 (Fla. 1931).
'1 DILLON, MUNICIPAT CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911), § 237, quoted with
approval in Hyre v. Brown, 102 W. Va. 505, 135 S. E. 656 (1926).
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REGENT CASE COMMENTS
tending conventions for the purpose of educating delegates with
reference to questions pertaining to municipal administration have
been generally held not to be a proper charge on public funds.'
Municipal aid in financing private enterprises with public funds is
held not a municipal or public purpose," although the benefits of
added trade seem more obvious than those from advertising. Stim-
ulation of trade has never been held to be either a governmental
or municipal function of cities or towns.' There is a growing
tendency to hold valid expenditures to put up monuments and
hold patriotic celebrations as "tending to stimulate patriotism"
although it is not clear to what express power such expenditures
are incident.'
A too liberal application of the doctrine of implied powers
may lead to abuse. In corporations generally the act of the
majority is the act of the corporation; to protect individual rights
of the minority their liability should not be extended to unlimited
and indefinite objects. Otherwise there will be no limit to the
amount of money which may be expended under implied powers,
nor to the mode in which such expenditures may be made; except
that which the will of the majority prescribe. The objection on
the score of probable abuse of power may be lessened by express
authorization imposing definite restrictions on the power, and
defining the terms of its exercise. Authorization of such powers
by statutes or home rule charters would apparently be constitu-
tional.'
Although public opinion in the future may change the ex-
isting social policy, yet as local political conditions now exist
efficiency and economy do not always go hand in hand with the
expenditure of public funds. Therefore, may not the advertising
of municipal advantages better be left to some civic organization,
such as the Chamber of Commerce?
-DoNALD M. HuTToN.
See collection of cases, note L.R.A. 1917E 331. Contra: Tousley v. Leach,
230 N. W. 788 (Minn. 1930).
rOhio Valley Iron Works v. City of Moundsville, 11 W. Va. 1 (1877);
Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487, 27 L. Ed. 238 (1882).
6'cQuiLLIN, Tim LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATi NS (2d ed. 1928) §§
2325, 2328, 2329.
7 Battle, The Powers of a Municipality to Spend its Funds for Public Cele.
brations, Monuments, etc. (1924) 10 VA. L. REV. 417.
"Debts incurred under statutory authorization by City of Philadelphia for
Sesqui-Centennial celebration held valid. Sambor v. Hadley, 291 Pa. 395, 140
Ati. 347 (1928).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1931], Art. 18
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss1/18
